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The Efficiency of Sponsor and Participant 
Portfolios Choices in 401(k) Plans 
 
Ning Tang, Olivia S. Mitchell, Gary R, Mottola, and Stephen P. Utkus 
 
With the growing numbers of investors and assets in 401(k) plans, as well as their 
increasingly prominent role in the financing of retirement,1 renewed attention has turned to the 
question of whether 401(k) portfolios are efficient.  All else equal, for a given level of risk and 
return, better diversified portfolios would be expected to yield more retirement wealth than 
poorly diversified holdings.  As a result, the question of how well these assets are invested is of 
substantial interest to policymakers and plan sponsors who oversee the system, as well as 
participants who anticipate using these resources as a source of income in retirement.   
Portfolio performance in 401(k) plans depends on two factors: the choice of investment 
menu by plan sponsors, and the investment choices made by participants. Previous work has 
suggested that a large number of plan menus may be inefficient, reducing long-term wealth 
accumulation by around half (Elton, Gruber, and Blake or hereafter EGB, 2006; Angus, Brown, 
Smith, and Smith, 2007).  But those conclusions may be questions due to their reliance on small 
and specialized datasets. 
At same time, several studies have highlighted the behavioral biases and financial literacy 
constraints that appear to hinder participant decision-making.  Some plan participants appear to 
use naive allocation strategies (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Agnew, 2002); others exhibit inertia 
in asset allocation and rebalancing (Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004; Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden, 
2003); and still others are subject to framing and default effects in investment choices (Benartzi 
______________________________ 
1 Private-sector DC retirement programs covered over 50 million active participants and held assets over $2 trillion  
as of 2008 (ICI, 2009).  DC plans are expected to be the primary source of retirement funding for a substantial 
fraction of future U.S. retirees (Poterba, Venti and Wise, 2007).   
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and Thaler, 2002, Karlsson, Massa, and Simonov, 2007). Plan participants also display low 
levels of financial literacy and investment savvy (Hancock, 2002, Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; 
Van Rooij, Kool and Prast, 2007); build poorly diversified portfolios (Mottola and Utkus, 2008); 
overinvest in company stock (Liang and Weisbenner, 2002; Huberman and Sengmueller, 2004; 
Benartzi, Thaler, Utkus and Sunstein, 2007); and follow their peers (Duflo and Saez, 2002). In 
previous work, we have also found that excessive trading in 401(k) plans is costly (Yamaguchi, 
Mitchell, Mottola, and Utkus, 2006).2  Despite this inventory of possible decision-making errors, 
few of these studies have attempted to quantify the extent of efficiency losses in the 401(k) 
context. 
This paper distinguishes efficiency losses arising from the sponsor’s investment menu 
design, versus participant portfolio choices. Our study builds on a dataset encompassing over one 
thousand firms and nearly one million participants, a substantially larger sample than previous 
available to other studies. With both plan-level data and as well individual participant holdings, 
we are uniquely able to separately identify and measure the size of diversification losses results 
from these two distinct portfolio decisions.   
To preview our findings, we show that, contrary to previous studies, the overwhelming 
majority of 401(k) plan menus in our sample are efficiency when compared to a global market 
portfolio. Thus, participants could construct a mean-variance efficient portfolio in virtually all of 
the plans we analyzed.  Nevertheless, the real-world participants in our dataset fall short of 
exploiting the efficient menus provided to them, failing to diversify adequately as measured by 
return losses and portfolio shares of idiosyncratic risk.  We estimate that retirement wealth over a 
35-year worklife might be reduced by as much as one-fifth due to participant diversification 
______________________________ 
2 EGB (2007) compare participant portfolios with alternative portfolios formed by a naive (1/N) allocation strategy. 
 
 3
errors.  Indeed, employees’ actual portfolios yield worse results than what could be obtained 
from a simple naïve allocation, where account balances would be divided evenly across the 
offered menu. For this reason, we conclude that efforts to improve 401(k) portfolio efficiency 
would best focus on improving participant portfolio choices through such strategies as greater 
use of default investing or portfolio advice services.  Also, while sponsors generally construct 
efficient menus, we note that efficiency of an investment menu is less about offering large 
numbers of funds and more about choosing a limited number of options diversified across the 
capital markets. 
In the remainder of the paper, we first describe the data and then assess the degree of both 
plan and individual portfolio efficiency. Next, we investigate the factors which influence 
portfolio performance/efficiency. A final section concludes. 
 
Empirical Overview 
Our dataset consists of 401(k) plans managed by Vanguard, a leading 401(k) 
administrator and mutual fund investment manager.  Plan-level data include both the number and 
type of investment choices offered, total assets under management, numbers of participants 
accounts, plan type,3 and the monthly total return for each fund for the seven years prior.4  
Participant data include information on active accounts including account balances and amounts 
held by the fund, contribution sources (employer or employee), and participant 
sociodemographics (age, sex, plan tenure, non-retirement financial wealth, household income, 
______________________________ 
3 Most of the plans are 401(k) plans in for-profit firms; there are also a few 403(b) plans for the non-profit sector. 
4 Monthly returns cover the period December 1997 through December 2004.  In a handful of cases, some funds have 
fewer than 85 months of return observations. 
 
 4
homeownership status, and whether the participant had web access).5   Our sample includes 
986,949 participants in 1,003 plans observed in December 2004.   
Table 1 summarizes characteristics of the plans and investment menu offerings in our 
sample.  The average 401(k) plan had 1,222 participants holding $73 million in assets (Panel A).  
Virtually all sponsors provided access to the range of broad asset classes, including short- and 
longer-duration fixed income options, balanced, lifecycle or similar options, and equity options 
(Panel B).  Domestic active and index equity options were the most prevalent option (Panel C), 
followed by money market and stable value options.  Company stock was offered in 11 percent 
of plans, and a brokerage window in only two percent of the plans.   
Table 1 here 
As shown in Table 2, the mean and median plan in our sample offered participants about 
14 different investment choices in their 401(k) plans, consistent with other studies examining 
investment menus.6  Figure 1 reveals the dispersion, from a low of 3 to a high of 59.  A typical 
plan offered about four actively-managed domestic equity funds, three actively-managed 
balanced funds, and just over two indexed domestic equity choices as the most common options. 
Figure 1 and Table 2 here 
Using a much smaller longitudinal data set Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner (2007) 
suggest that over time, the fraction of equity options in 401(k) plans has grown and most of the 
newly-added funds were of the actively-managed variety.  They also indicate that this 
______________________________ 
5 Active accounts are those with non-zero contributions over a 24-month window prior to our analysis (for the 24 
months of 2003 and 2004).  Data from IXI Corporation are used to impute non-retirement household financial 
wealth and household income is imputed by Axiom for 2003 using participant ZIP codes. Those who have elected to 
obtain plan information via the internet are defined as having web access.   
6 All data are as of as of December 2004.  Using 2002 data, Brown, Liang and Weisbenner report a mean of 14 plan 
options based on a sample of firms filing 11-Ks; in 2004, the Profit-sharing/401(k) Council of America reported an 
average number of options of 17-18.  Our figure is larger than the eight in EGB’s (2006) older data on 401(k) plans 
surveyed in 2001 by Moody’s Investor Service.   
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development might be costly to participants, if the index funds are less expensive and outperform 
higher-cost actively managed funds. In Figure 2, we array a cross-section of the funds in our 
sample according to the number of menu options and their investment management style (active 
versus passive). Here we see that as the total number of funds increases in the cross-section, 
domestic equity funds do indeed become more common, whether of the index or active variety.  
Also active strategies are more prevalent than index strategies, and larger plans offer more active 
equity choices than smaller plans, though they also provide more index funds.  For example, a 
plan with a small menu might offer a broad-based domestic index fund and access to a handful of 
actively equity funds; meanwhile, a plan with a more complex menu might also offer large-, 
mid- and/or small-capitalization components of the index, along with even greater choice of 
active portfolios.   
Figure 2 here 
Turning to participants and their portfolio allocations, Panel A of Table 3 summarizes 
demographic characteristics.7  The mean participant is 45 years old, male, with annual household 
income of about $86,000. Non-retirement wealth amounts to about $42,000; most participants 
(96 percent) own a home; and almost half (45 percent) of them have web access. Panel B 
describes participant portfolios, where the mean 401(k) plan balance is $63,000.8  On average, 
participants select 3.7 funds for their portfolio and hold the majority (88) percent of their 
balances in risky assets (defined here as any equity or bond market asset with a fluctuating 
______________________________ 
7 Table 3 is computed for 986,614 participants; we lose a few participants because of missing demographic data. The 
efficiency measure used requires some nonzero risk exposure.  All portfolio data is based on account balances. 
8 These figures are similar to a much broader sample from ICI (2008), where the average age is 44 and the mean 
balance is $65,000. 
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market value).  The average participant held 28 percent of assets in index funds (either indexed 
bonds, equities or balanced options).9   
Table 3 here  
Plan and participant fund choices are reviewed in Figure 3, where we note a considerable 
association between fund types offered and selected.10  It may be that plan sponsors offer the 
options that participants demand, or conversely, that participants naively allocate their assets 
across the funds on the menu. There is evidence of overinvestment in company stock: that is, 
people hold a much higher share of company stock than is offered (perhaps influenced by 
sponsors who direct a portion of employer contributions to employer stock). Participant 
portfolios here tend to be dominated by domestic equity funds, either actively- or passively-
managed, as well as actively-managed balanced funds. Lastly, participants tend to select 
actively-managed instead of index funds, except in the case of bonds. This may be partly due to 
the recent growth of actively-managed balanced funds.  
 Figure 3 here 
 
Tests for Plan Menu Efficiency 
To assess the efficiency of plan sponsor menu choices, we first compare existing plan 
menus with market benchmarks. Because we evaluate the efficiency of risky portfolios, our 
______________________________ 
9 Thus, the average participant held 12 percent in money market or stable value assets, 28 percent in indexed assets 
(stocks, bonds or balanced strategies), and the remaining 60 percent in active strategies (stocks, bonds or balanced 
strategies).   
10 These participant allocations are comparable to those reported by the EBRI/ICI Participant Data Collection 
Project (ICI, 2008).  In our sample, equity funds account for 52 percent of the assets; balanced funds 19 percent; 
bond funds 8 percent; company stock 9 percent; and money market and stable value funds 12 percent. By 
comparison in the EBRI/ICI sample, equity fund and balanced fund allocations for the same year at 46 percent and 8 
percent; bonds 10 percent; company stock 15 percent; and money market and stable value funds 16 percent. 
 
 7
analysis is centered on the bond, equity, and balanced fund options held by each plan.11  We 
measure plan-level efficiency in three ways.  The first efficiency test applies the intersection or 
“spanning” test developed by DeRoon, Nijman and Werker (2001). This test classifies plans as 
either efficient or not based on how well they cover or span the global (liquid) capital markets.  
However, this test does not provide a measure of how far a plan might fall from being efficient.  
Accordingly, we provide two additional efficiency measures used in Calvet, Campbell and 
Sodini (hereafter CCS, 2007): a plan-specific relative Sharpe ratio loss (RSRL) and a plan’s 
idiosyncratic risk share.  
The analysis of both plan sponsor and participant decisions draws on a seven-year (84-
month) reference period from 12/97-12/04 to develop the optimal or tangency portfolio offered 
by the global capital markets during this period; plan sponsor fund selections and participant 
fund choices are then compared with this global benchmark.  For this period, as a longer historic 
period from ‘79-04, Table 4 reports historic excess returns (versus Treasury bills) and standard 
deviation for various asset classes. One characteristic of our reference period is that investors 
experienced a lower equity risk premium for U.S. stocks, of one percent for large-capitalization 
growth stocks and five percent for large-capitalization value stocks, versus 7.5 percent and 9 
percent, respectively over the longer period.  A second aspect is a distinctive bias toward value 
stocks, while a third is higher stock market volatility and lower bond market volatility. While our 
overall results should be interpreted in light of these characteristics, our reference period remains 
a useful benchmark for analyzing the relative returns of plan sponsor menus and participant 
portfolios versus a global market benchmark, because all are being evaluated by the same 
______________________________ 
11  Hence assets with a stable value (money funds and stable value funds) are excluded. Money market and 
investment contract funds are excluded as non-risky assets.  Brokerage option investments are also excluded as we 
cannot observe their returns (only 2 percent of plans offer these). Returns on mutual funds are computed after 
expenses, while all other index returns are before expenses. 
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yardstick.  In the worst case, the efficiency losses we report below are likely to be lower-bound 
estimates.   
Table 4 here 
The “spanning” test of efficiency.  The first test of plan sponsor menu efficiency considers 
whether a given plan’s menu could be made more efficient by introducing investment classes 
currently excluded from the plan menu. As in EGB (2006), we construct a global market 
benchmark composed of eight commonly-accepted market indexes which “span” the world’s 
liquid stock and bond markets. The eight indexes include four domestic equity indexes following 
the Fama-French equity style classification (Russell 1000 Growth, Russell 1000 Value, Russell 
2000 Growth, and Russell 2000 Value Indexes); two domestic bond indexes based on credit 
quality (Lehman Aggregate Index for the investment-grade bond market and Credit Suisse First 
Boston High Yield for the non-investment-grade market); 12  one international equity index 
(MSCI EAFE Index); and one international bond index (JP Morgan Global Government Bond 
Non-US$ Index).  Finally, the one-month Treasury-bill rate is taken as risk-free interest rate. 
For each plan examined over our 84-month reference period, we regress ri,t, the excess 
returns of the ith benchmark index (i=1,2…8) over Treasury bills in a given month, on the 
monthly returns on the subset of funds held by the plan, : tR
 titiiti Rr ,,     (1)      
In this formulation, i is the Jensen’s alpha from regression on ith benchmark index. Under this 
test of efficiency, there are short sale constraints for both funds in a plan and market benchmark 
index. As short-sales are not allowed for market benchmark index, if none of the i  are 
______________________________ 
12 Blake, Elton and Gruber (1993) suggest including a high-yield bond index to capture differences in return across 
bond funds. 
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statistically significantly positive, we could conclude that performance of funds under the 
plan  cannot be improved by holding a long position in any of the eight market benchmark 
indexes.
tR
13 
Our results are reported in Table 5, where Panel A indicates that 94 percent of the 1,003 
plans studied are efficient compared to market benchmarks, by this test.  This implies that most 
401(k) plan participants, in the majority of plans, could invest efficiently if they wisely exploited 
the choices made available to them by their employer. Even plans with relatively few investment 
choices can still be as efficient as our global benchmark portfolio, as long as they are carefully 
chosen—a point we return to in the next section.   
Table 5 here  
Our finding of exceptionally high levels of 401(k) menu efficiency differs from EGB’s 
earlier (2006) result, where efficiency ratings were worse.  Two factors may account for this 
difference. First, the EGB sample was a few years older, from 2001, and sponsors are likely to 
have boosted the range of options provided by 2004. Second, their plans were smaller and far 
less diversified than ours: for instance, only 71 percent plans in the EGB sample offered 
domestic bond funds whereas 97 percent of our sample did so.   
Relative Sharpe ratio loss.  Our second measure of plan sponsor menu efficiency is the relative 
Sharpe ratio loss, which measures the extent of economic loss from holding an inefficient 
portfolio in the mean-variance framework (CCS, 2007).  In our case, the portfolio to be measured 
is the tangency portfolio of a plan based on the fund options it offers.  The benchmark portfolio 
______________________________ 
13 The specific test statistic is:  , where )ˆ(]ˆ[)'ˆ(min 1
}0{
    Var ˆ  is an 8*1 vector of estimated 
Jensen’s alphas. For the critical value used in the test, we adopt the lower/upper bounds suggested by Kodde and 
Palm (1986) and run 1,000 simulations to see if the test statistic falls within the critical value bounds. 
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is defined as the tangency portfolio formed by the eight market benchmark indexes introduced 
earlier. For portfolio p, the relative Sharpe ratio loss is defined as: 
B
p
p S
S
RSRL  1                  (2) 
where 
p
p
pS  ˆ
ˆ
 is the Sharpe ratio of tangency portfolio of funds held under the plan; the 
moments of the plan are estimated by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM; see the Appendix 
for details); and is the Sharpe ratio of tangency portfolio of eight benchmark indexes used in 
the efficiency test. The moments of the eight indexes are also estimated using CAPM.  From 
equation (2), we can see that the lower the ratio, the closer are the portfolio and benchmark 
Sharpe ratios.  In other words, when the two Sharpe ratios are exactly equal, the right hand term 
is zero and there is no relative efficiency loss.   
BS
The first row of Panel B in Table 5 provides the distribution of relative Sharpe ratio 
losses of the tangency portfolio formed by the available funds in each plan. Overall, the 401(k) 
plans in our analysis sample perform very well compared to the benchmark portfolio: the mean 
relative Sharpe ratio loss of three percent is quite low. In other words, the Sharpe ratio of the 
tangency portfolio of an average plan is 97 percent of that of the benchmark portfolio (1 - .97/1 
= .03). Furthermore, the sample plans vary little in terms of their relative Sharpe ratio losses: 
even at the 90th percentile, the loss measure is only five percent. A small group of plans is less 
well-structured; thus at the 99th percentile, the efficiency loss is 66 percent.14 
Idiosyncratic risk share. Our third measure of plan menu efficiency is idiosyncratic risk share 
measures—namely the percentage of portfolio total variance attributable to idiosyncratic risk. 
______________________________ 
14 There appear to be two main sources of inefficiency.  One is that these plans lack fixed income funds, which we 
note again below. A second is that many of the most inefficient plans have small menus (the mean number of 
options is 8) with an overallocation to active equity or balanced funds.   
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Idiosyncratic risk is defined as the risk that can be diversified away; it is non-market risk (CCS 
2007), or specifically:    
p
pidio
pIRS 
 ˆ
ˆ
,                  (3) 
where is the idiosyncratic risk of the tangency portfolio of funds held by the plan, and  
is the total risk of the tangency portfolio. The lower the ratio, the more diversified a plan is 
against specific or non-market risk.   
pidio,ˆ p
^
The distribution of idiosyncratic risk shares across our sample of plans is displayed in the 
second row in Panel B, of Table 5. On average, the idiosyncratic risk is three percent; in other 
words, only three percent of the total variance of a plan’s tangency portfolio is diversifiable risk. 
Even at the 90th percentile, the ratio is still below eight percent, which indicates a very high 
diversification level. It is interesting that a handful, only one percent of the plans, do not perform 
well according to this measure, having an idiosyncratic risk share of over 21 percent.15 
Separately, we calculate relative Sharpe ratio losses and idiosyncratic risk shares for the 
two groups of plans, efficient and inefficient, that emerge from the first “spanning” test.  
Inefficient plans are not very different from efficient plans in the aggregate, suggesting that small 
changes to many of the inefficient plans could improve their characteristics.  Specifically, the 
inefficient six percent of plans had a relative Sharpe ratio loss of four percent and idiosyncratic 
risk shares of five percent, versus three and three percent for efficient plans.  However, as noted 
above, a small percentage of plans has very large Sharpe ratio losses or shares of idiosyncratic 
risk and modest changes in these plans are unlikely to result in a shift from an inefficient to an 
efficient plan.  
______________________________ 
15 As in the analysis of Sharpe ratio losses, these plans’ inefficiency appears due to the absence of bond funds, along 
with to a limited extent active equity and balanced fund choices in small menus.   
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In sum, we conclude that virtually all of the plan menus offered in this sample are quite 
efficient in terms of mean-variance efficiency measures, as they are well diversified.  By and 
large, plan sponsors appear to construct menus that afford participants the opportunity to build 
well-diversified portfolios.  Even among the few inefficient plans, many do not far terribly short 
and these shortfalls can be remedied by modest menu changes.   
 
Tests for Participant Portfolio Efficiency  
Next we turn to the efficient of the individual portfolios constructed by participants.  In 
contrast to the prior section where our analysis is conducted at the plan level, the focus here 
shifts to the individual portfolios constructed by each participant.  We use three measures to 
evaluate the efficiency of participant portfolio choices:  
(1) Participant total return loss, or the return loss in the participant’s portfolio compared 
to what he could have optimally obtained in a global capital markets benchmark, independent of 
the menu choices offered to him or her; this measure summarizes losses due to inefficient 
portfolio choices by both the sponsor and the participant; 
(2) Participant relative return loss, or the return loss in the participant’s portfolio 
compared to the set of investment choices offered to him or her; these are losses due purely to 
participant (and not plan sponsor) investment errors; and, 
(3) Participant idiosyncratic risk share, or the extent to which participant portfolio 
returns arise from market (nondiversifiable) versus specific (diversifiable) risk.     
Participant total return loss.  A participant’s “total return loss” is the shortfall in portfolio return 
experienced by a participant’s actual portfolio, given his choice of risk, compared to the return 
he could have realized in the broader global capital markets for the same level of risk.  Assume 
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that a participant in plan j  chooses a portfolio  with risk levelp p . The monthly total return 
loss for his portfolio is:  
)( pBpp wRL     (4)  
where B  is the best return that could be optimally attained at risk level p  using the eight 
market benchmark indexes representing the liquid global capital markets ; and p  is the actual 
return of the participant’s portfolio for the same risk level p . The term  refers to the risky 
asset share, which is calculated using the balances in each individual participant’s portfolio. This 
weight permits the measure to reflect the fact that participants holding poorly performing risky 
assets might still be close to the efficient frontier if they their risky exposure is small. The un-
scaled total return loss before weight adjustment is demonstrated by the line segment A in Figure 
4, where (
pw
p , p ) is the actual portfolio chosen by the participant, and the outer curve is the 
efficient frontier formed by the eight market benchmark indexes.  
Figure 4 here 
To measure this in practice, we use the distribution of the monthly participant total return 
losses for the 986,949 individual portfolios in 1,003 plans, depicted in Figure 5.  The mean 
monthly total return loss is 0.1093 percent or approximately 11 basis points; about three percent 
of the participants have a return loss of zero, while one percent of participants have a total return 
loss of over 0.4 percent or 40 basis points per month.  To put these results in context, if one 
expected a diversified 401(k) portfolio to generate an annual real return of five percent after 
expenses, the typical participant would be predicted to forfeit 23 percent of his expected 
retirement wealth over a 35-year worklife by having a less-than-adequate plan investment menu 
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and by failing to diversify adequately.16   Wealth losses would be even greater for those in the 
fifth or first percentile cases. 
Figure 5 here 
Participant relative return loss.  Next we compute the participant total return loss, which 
measures the total shortfall due to both plan sponsor menu and participant investment choices.  
The participant relative return loss reflects only the inefficiency resulting from poor participant 
investment choices within a given plan. We evaluate this by computing the best return obtainable 
in plan j for risk level p or is B in equation (4), keeping all other factors constant. That is, we 
calculate the return shortfall of each actual individual portfolio compared to the best return that 
could be obtained in the same plan for the same risk level. Thus, line segment B in Figure 4 
reflects the un-scaled relative return loss before weight adjustment in equation (6), where the 
interior curve is the efficient frontier formed by funds available in a plan. (The difference 
between segments A and B measures the inefficiency caused by menu restrictions.) 
pw
Panel B in Figure 5 sketches the distribution of monthly relative return losses for the 
same participants, where we see that these losses are concentrated around a monthly mean loss of 
0.079 percent or 8 basis points per month.  At the extremes, some six percent of the participants 
have a return loss of zero, while one percent of participants experience a return loss of over 0.29 
percent or 29 basis points per month.  The mean monthly relative return loss of eight basis points 
would imply 18 percent less in retirement wealth over a 35-year saving period.  
From this measure, we conclude that most participants fail to construct an optimal 
portfolio from the menu offered to them by their plan sponsor, and an important subset of 
______________________________ 
16 We assume a participant saves for 35 years, has an initial salary of $30,000 a year, experiences real wage growth 
of 1 percent per year and real after-fee returns of 5 percent per year (a monthly return of 41 basis points), and 
contributions 9 percent of pay to his 401(k) account (6 percent employee and 3 percent employer contribution).  
Terminal wealth is $276,700 with a 5 percent real return; $212,100 with the reduced return. 
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participants suffers a substantial return loss, undermining long term wealth accumulation. On 
average, the relative return loss from participant investment mistakes accounts for three-quarters 
(76 percent) of the total return loss, indicating that participant portfolio choice inefficiency is the 
main source of underperformance.  About one-quarter of the efficiency loss could be addressed 
by better plan menus.  
Participant idiosyncratic risk share. Our third participant measure is the idiosyncratic risk share 
of an individual participant’s portfolio, defined as the ratio of idiosyncratic risk to the portfolio’s 
total variance. Figure 6 on the distribution of this measure shows that the mean value of the 
idiosyncratic risk share is 0.187, much higher than the 0.03 share in the average plan. There is a 
wide range in idiosyncratic risk shares from 0.001 to 0.997; also the top five percent of 
participants has an idiosyncratic risk share of more than 0.77, meaning that 77 percent of the 
portfolio variance is not rewarded by higher expected return.  By this measure, many participants 
also take a substantial amount of specific or idiosyncratic risk, either because they hold actively-
managed funds or company stock in their portfolios. 
Figure 6 here 
Actual portfolios versus naïve allocation strategies.  As a measure of the costs of poor portfolio 
choices, we compare participants’ actual portfolio choices with what would happen if they used 
a naïve diversification strategy, such as simply dividing their portfolio among all available funds 
using a 1/N strategy.  To do so, we evaluate the relative return loss and idiosyncratic risk share of 
a hypothetical participant in each plan who follows a naive allocation strategy, and compare the 
results to workers’ actual portfolio characteristics. Results appear in Figure 7, which confirm that 
actual individual portfolios underperform even the naive allocation strategy.  Individual 
portfolios have a slightly higher relative return loss (0.079 vs.0.076 percent per month).  But they 
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also have a much higher idiosyncratic risk share (0.187 vs. 0.04), suggesting that individual 
portfolios are more highly exposed to non-market risk through active funds and company stock 
than would hold with a simple naïve strategy. 
Figure 7 here 
 
Determinants of Portfolio Efficiency: Behavioral and Plan Menu Effects 
Given the meaningful inefficiencies we have identified in portfolio choices in 401(k) and 
other DC plans, what might be done to enhance investment patterns?  Two approaches might be 
taken to improve 401(k) investment performance: improving investment menu decisions by plan 
sponsors, or altering individual participant investment choices.  In this section, we examine 
factors contributing to the variation in portfolio performance across plan investment menus and 
participant portfolios, so as to explore what characteristics contribute to portfolio efficiency in 
each setting.  In particular, we seek to learn whether simply adding more funds, as many plan 
sponsors are doing today, is likely to boost plan efficiency at the menu level, and, at the 
participant level, what types of asset allocation changes are needed to improve diversification 
levels. 
Plan sponsor menu effects.  To determine what plan sponsor menu decisions might influence 
plan efficiency, we run multivariate regressions of the form: 
  jijjj PRTCHARPLANCHARPLANCOMPPerform ,321  (5) 
where the dependent variable  is a vector of outcomes of the previous measures of 
plan-level efficiency.  Specifically, the vector includes: a (0,1) indicator with the value of 1 if the 
plan is efficient (0 if not); the plan’s relative Sharpe ratio loss; and the plan’s idiosyncratic risk 
share. The explanatory variable PLANCOMP represents a vector of plan characteristics including 
jPerform
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the number of options offered and the availability of different types of risky funds. A second 
vector of explanatory variables PLANCHAR is used to control for plan characteristics such as 
plan size (measured by the natural logarithm of the number of accounts, the log of the plan’s 
total assets, and contribution source). We also control on PRTCHAR, which captures participant 
characteristics such as age, sex, plan tenure, and income as well as asset indicators – some of 
which are likely correlated with financial sophistication (the natural logs of household income 
and non-retirement financial wealth, as well as homeownership and web access).  
Table 6 shows the results of these multivariate models, where the first is a Probit 
regression on whether or not the plan is efficient, and the other two are OLS regressions on the 
relative Sharpe ratio loss and idiosyncratic risk share. The first equation indicates that simply 
having more funds listed on the menu does not improve plan efficiency. The second suggest that 
adding funds does reduce the relative Sharpe ratio loss and idiosyncratic risk share.  For example, 
at the mean, adding one fund reduces these factors by -0.4 percent, or more than 10 percent of 
the mean loss and mean risk share.  The marginal benefit from adding more options is also 
decreasing, as indicated by the concave relationship from the variable, the number of options 
squared.  This result suggests that adding more options may improve menu design but at a 
declining rate.   
Table 6 here  
Figure 8 reinforces this conclusion. It shows the average relative Sharpe ratio loss and 
idiosyncratic risk share calculated earlier, for plans arrayed by the number of funds offered.  The 
measures fall dramatically until about ten options and then declines at a much smaller rate for 
larger menus.  It would seem that a well-chosen menu of 10 options achieves much of the 
efficiency gains to be realized.    
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Figure 8 here 
In terms of investment options, the plan efficiency test (the first column in Table 6) 
implies that indexed domestic equities and bonds would the main asset classes that inefficient 
plans would have to add.  Since most of the inefficient plans are small in size, it would appear 
that the limited number of index and active equity and balanced choices in their line-up are 
insufficient for adequate diversification.   
Participant portfolio decisions.  We examine the determinants of participant portfolio choices 
using the following multivariate regression:   
jijjijiji PLANDEMOINVESTPERFORM ,3,2,1,    (6)  
For the ith participant in the jth plan, dependent variables  refer to the portfolio 
relative return losses as well as idiosyncratic risk share calculated previously at the participant 
account level.  refers to a vector of individual investment characteristics including the 
number of funds chosen, company stock share and shares of eight types of funds: index and 
active versions of domestic equity, international equity, balanced funds and bond funds.  
 refers to individual demographic characteristics such as the participant’s age, income, 
non-retirement wealth, and web access.  refers to a vector of plan-specific characteristics 
which affect participant performance and are common among all participants in the same plan.
jiPerform ,
jiINVEST ,
jiDEMO ,
jPLAN
17 
Table 7 reports results for our two dependent variables, the participant’s relative return 
loss and the participant’s idiosyncratic risk share. Holding more funds in a portfolio does reduce 
______________________________ 
17 To eliminate unobserved plan fixed effects, , we transformation the data as follows:  
, where , 
and are the plan level mean of ,  and respectively. 
jPlan
ji, 
Perform
jijjijjji DemoDemoInvestInvestPerformPerform ,
______
,2
_______
1
__________
, )()()(  
______
jDemo
_______
jInvest ji , jiInvest , jiDemo ,
jPerform
__________
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return losses, but only by an economically tiny effect (by two-hundreds of a basis point versus a 
mean loss of eight basis points).  However, owning more funds does reduce idiosyncratic risk 
meaningfully—adding an additional fund reduces such risk by six percent.  Second, participant 
portfolios can best be improved from a return loss perspective by diversifying into all asset 
classes other than the reference category, domestic indexed equities.  In terms of the most 
important asset class to consider, it would be bond funds, active or passive.  Yet at the same time, 
as measured in the second regression, such portfolios do (at the margin) increase idiosyncratic 
risk relative to domestic index holdings.   
Table 7 here 
Finally, we find that in terms of participant characteristics, those who access their 
accounts through the internet have lower return losses, but also higher exposure to non-market 
risk.  At the margin, young and higher-income participants have smaller return losses, as do 
those with more wealth outside their retirement plan.  In any event the measured economic 
effects are quite small.  
 
Conclusions and Discussion  
We consider the quality of portfolio investment choices made in 401(k) and other U.S. 
defined contribution plans using a rich new dataset of more than 1,000 plans and nearly one 
million participants.  Our assessment distinguishes between the effects arising from the plan 
sponsor’s menu design decisions, versus those arising from the portfolio decisions of plan 
participants.  Overwhelmingly, we find that the plans in our sample are efficient compared to a 
global capital markets benchmark; we classified 94 percent of plans as efficient, and only six 
percent as inefficient.  Many of the inefficient plans could make small changes to improve 
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diversification levels by adding domestic equity and bond portfolios to their existing line-ups.  
Moreover, simply adding more investment options does not necessarily lead to large gains in 
efficiency.  Once a minimum number of well-chosen funds is included in a pension plan menu 
(roughly 10 or so), most of the diversification gains are likely to have been realized.     
At the same time, while sponsors are able to construct highly-efficient plan menus, many 
participants err by investing ineffectively and by failing to exploit the diversification 
opportunities offered within their plans.  On average, they forfeit eight basis points of potential 
return per month based on our analysis period.  Because of the long-term effects from 
compounding such errors, small mistakes over time can be important, reducing retirement wealth 
by as much as one-fifth over a 35-year worklife.  These findings complement the growing 
literature on investor behavioral biases, investment errors, and financial illiteracy.   
One avenue for improving participant portfolios is to improve financial education and 
investment literacy levels. But education programs require pro-active decision-making by 
participants, and it is by now well established that inertia is a dominant decision heuristic for 
many participants.  Accordingly, sponsors and policymakers will want to consider efforts to 
improve participant portfolios through other means.  These might include better default 
investment strategies as well as investment advice programs.  The U.S. Department of Labor, 
acting under the 2006 Pension Protection Act, has authorized a series of “qualified default 
investment alternatives” (QDIAs) including balanced funds, target-date strategies, and managed 
account advisory services. 18  Greater adoption of such strategies by plans and by participants 
(whether by active choice or by default) is likely to improve portfolio efficiency metrics within 
401(k) plans. 
______________________________ 
18 For a discussion of these see Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus and Yamaguchi (2009). 
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Although we focus here mainly on behavior in individual retirement accounts, our 
research has implications for portfolio choice and wealth outcomes more generally. Today 
almost half of all Americans have at least some assets in tax-deferred accounts, and furthermore, 
asset allocations prove to be quite similar inside and outside tax-deferred accounts (Bergstresser 
and Poterba 2004). Consequently, it is likely that the inefficiencies observed in the retirement 
context are replicated outside the 401(k) setting.  
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Table 1.  Plan Characteristics: Size and Investment Menus 
A.  Plan size Mean Median
Plan assets (millions) $73.4 $15.6
Plan participants 1222 246
B.  Broad asset classes Plans offering
Any short-duration fixed income fund 99.1%
Any bond fund 97.4%
Any balanced fund 96.5%
Any equity fund 99.9%
C.  Types of investment options Plans offering
Short-duration fixed income
Money market fund 74.6%
Investment contract (stable value) fund 50.2%
Longer-duration fixed income
Index bond fund 80.9%
Active bond fund 45.9%
Equity funds
Index domestic equity fund 99.2%
Active domestic equity fund 96.5%
Any domestic fund 99.9%
Index international equity fund 24.3%
Active international equity fund 84.2%
Any internatioanl fund 93.1%
Other options
Company stock 11.4%
Brokerage option 2.4%  
Source: Authors’ computations. Note: Brokerage option permits employees to choose among thousands of funds 
and/or individual securities depending on plan; N = 1,003 plans. 
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Table 2.  Number of Investment Options per Plan: Mean, Share, and Distribution by Type 
Mean 
options 
offered
Share of 
plan 
options
10th 
percentile
25th 
percentile Median
75th 
percentile
90th 
percentile
Total number of options per plan 13.5 100% 8 10 13 16 19
   Money market 1.3 11% 1 1 1 2 2
   Bond index 0.9 7% 0 1 1 1 1
   Bond actively managed 0.8 5% 0 0 0 1 2
   Balanced index 0.1 1% 0 0 0 0 1
   Balanced actively managed 2.7 19% 1 1 2 4 5
   Domestic equity index 2.5 19% 1 1 2 3 4
   Domestic equity actively managed 3.8 28% 2 2 3 5 7
   International equity index 0.3 2% 0 0 0 0 1
   International equity actively managed 1.0 8% 0 1 1 1 2
   Other 0.2 1% 0 0 0 0 1  
Source: Authors’ computations. Note:  N = 1,003 plans 
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Demographic characteristics
Age 45 30 37 45 52 58
Male (yes=1) 68% 0% 0% 100% 100% 100%
Household income $86,227 $35,000 $62,500 $86,319 $87,500 $137,500
Non-retirement wealth $41,708 $0 $1,677 $7,280 $35,737 $111,683
Web access (yes=1) 45% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100%
Homeowner (yes=1) 96% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Individual portfolio characteristics
Number of funds chosen 4 1 2 3 5 7
Average account balance ($000) $63.3 $2.3 $9.0 $28.2 $74.0 $158.3
Index share in portfolio 28% 0% 0% 21% 47% 76%
Risky share in portfolio 88% 53% 85% 100% 100% 100%
10th 
Percentile
Mean
90th 
Percentile
75th 
PercentileMedian
25th 
Percentile
 
Source: Authors’ computations. Note: A portfolio’s risky share is the fraction held in equities or bonds either directly  
through an equity or bond fund or indirectly through balanced, lifestyle or lifecycle funds. N = 986,614 participants. 
Table 3. Participant Characteristics: Sociodemographics and Portfolio Attributes 
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Table 4.  Asset Class Characteristics 
       Excess returns   Standard Deviation (σ)
Mean 
monthly Annualized Monthly Annualized
A.  1997 - 2004 (reference period)
Russell 1000 Growth Index 0.08% 1.00% 6.21% 21.51%
Russell 1000 Value Index 0.42% 5.19% 4.55% 15.75%
Russell 2000 Growth Index 0.30% 3.61% 8.31% 28.79%
Russell 2000 Value Index 0.73% 9.14% 4.93% 17.09%
Lehman Aggregate Bond Index 0.27% 3.31% 1.06% 3.67%
Credit Suisse First Boston High Yield Bond Index 0.27% 3.27% 2.16% 7.50%
MSCI-EAFE Index 0.27% 3.35% 4.67% 16.17%
J.P. Morgan Global Government Bond Non-US$ Index 0.37% 4.52% 2.54% 8.80%
Large-capitalization value premium 0.34% 4.18%
Small-capitalization value premium 0.44% 5.53%
B.  1979 - 2004 
Russell 1000 Growth Index 0.60% 7.48% 5.22% 18.08%
Russell 1000 Value Index 0.73% 9.06% 4.15% 14.38%
Russell 2000 Growth Index 0.57% 7.08% 6.89% 23.87%
Russell 2000 ValueIndex 0.86% 10.88% 4.78% 16.54%
Lehman Aggregate Bond Index 0.25% 3.09% 1.78% 6.18%
Credit Suiss First Boston High Yield Bond Index N/A N/A N/A N/A
MSCI-EAFE Index 0.47% 5.81% 4.92% 17.05%
J.P. Morgan Global Government Bond Non-US$ Index N/A N/A N/A N/A
Large-capitalization growth premium 0.12% 1.58%
Small-capitalization growth premium 0.29% 3.81%
 
Source: Authors' computations from data supplied by index providers. 
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Table 5.  Plan Menu Efficiency Measures 
A. Spanning Test 
% of plans
Efficent plans 94%
Inefficient plans 6%
Total 100%
 
B. Other Menu Performance Measures 
Relative Sharpe ratio loss 3% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 5% 66%
Idiosyncratic risk share 3% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 8% 21%
Mean
1st 
Percentile
10th 
Percentile
25th 
Percentile
Median 75th 
Percentile
90th 
Percentile
99th 
Percentile
 
Source: Authors’ computations. Note: N=1,003 plans. 
 
 
Table 6.  Determinants of Plan Menu Efficiency  
Dependent variables Mean
Plan components
Number of funds 12 -0.18% -0.004 *** -0.003 ***
Number of funds squared 177 0.002% 0.0001 *** 0.0001 ***
Funds offered (yes = 1)
        Balanced index funds 0.13 -3.68% * 0.004 -0.001
        Balanced actively managed funds 0.93 0.89% 0.01 0.01 **
        Bond index funds 0.81 8.00% *** -0.13 *** -0.08 ***
        Bond actively managed funds 0.46 0.22% -0.05 *** -0.01 **
        Domestic equity index funds 0.99 16.89% ** 0.01 0.01
        Domestic equity actively managed funds 0.97 -2.30% 0.00 0.01
        International equity index funds 0.24 0.69% 0.02 ** 0.01
        International equity actively managed funds 0.84 -1.88% 0.005 0.01 **
        Company stock 0.11 -2.77% 0.02 0.01 *
R-squared 0.0426 0.3035 0.4769
(3) 
Idiosyncratic 
risk share
OLS coefficientMarginal effect
(1)                    
Plan efficiency dummy
(1=efficient, 0=inefficient)
OLS coefficient
(mean=94%) (mean=3%) (mean=3%)
(2)            
Relative Sharpe 
ratio loss
 
Source: Authors’ computations.  Note: Control variables at plan level include: log plan assets, log number of 
participants in the plan, average participant age, gender, plan tenure, log income, log non-retirement wealth, house 
ownership, web access, and contribution source. N = 1,003 plans.  
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Table 7.  Determinants of Participant Portfolio Efficiency  
 
Dependent variables Mean
Investment pattern
Number of funds chosen 3.72 0.0005% ** -1.26% ***
Balanced index funds share 0.5% -0.000001% 0.02% ***
Balanced actively managed funds share 17.8% -0.0002% ** 0.16% ***
Bond index funds share 5.2% -0.0008% ** 0.11% ***
Bond actively managed funds share 2.6% -0.0008% ** 0.17% ***
Domestic equity actively managed  funds share 26.6% -0.00004% ** 0.17% ***
International equity index funds share 0.5% -0.0003% ** 0.12% ***
International equity actively managed funds share 3.4% 0.0002% ** 0.05% ***
Company stock share 9.3% -0.0002% ** 0.88% ***
(Reference : Domestic equity index funds share)
Participant characteristics
Age 44.6 0.0001% ** 0.01% ***
Web access (1=Yes) 0.4 -0.0018% ** 0.15% ***
Ln household income ($000) 11.2 -0.0001% * 0.07% ***
Ln non-retirement financial wealth ($000) 8.1 -0.0001% ** -0.04% ***
R squared 0.2885 0.6058
Coefficient Coefficient
Relative return 
loss (in % per month)
Idiosyncratic 
risk share (in %)
(mean=0.079%) (mean=18.7%)
 
Source: Authors’ computations. Note: N = 986,614 participants.  
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Figure 1. Percentage of Plans Offering Various Numbers of Funds 
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Source: Authors’ computations. Note: N= 1,003 plans 
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Figure 2. Number of Index/ Actively Managed Funds vs. Total Number of Funds  
A. Number of Index Funds by Type vs. Number of Funds Offered 
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B. Number of Actively Managed (AM) Funds by Type vs. Number of Funds Offered 
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Figure 3.  Allocation of Individual Participant 
Portfolios
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
M
on
ey
 m
ark
et
Bo
nd
 in
de
x 
Bo
nd
 A
M
 
Ba
lan
ce
d i
nd
ex
Ba
lan
ce
d A
M
 
Do
me
sti
c e
qu
ity
 in
de
x
Do
me
sti
c e
qu
ity
 A
M
In
tl e
qu
ity
 in
de
x
In
tl e
qu
ity
 A
M
Co
mp
an
y s
toc
k
Sh
ar
e
Share (by number) in plan menu
Share (by number) in individual portfolio
Share (by amount) in individual portfolio
 
Source: Authors’ computations. Note:  N = 1,003 plans and 986,614 participants. 
 
 
Figure 4. Illustration of Total and Relative Return Loss 
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Figure 5. Distribution of Individual Portfolio Total Return and Relative Return Loss  
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B.   Relative Return Loss 
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Source: Authors’ computations. Note: N = 986,949 participants. 
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Figure 6.  Distribution of Individual Portfolio Idiosyncratic Risk Share  
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Source: Authors’ computations. Note: N = 986,949 participants. 
 
Figure 7.  Actual vs. Naive Allocation Portfolio Performance  
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Figure 8.  Performance Measures by Menu Number of Funds Offered  
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Source: Authors’ computations. Note: N = 993 plans. 
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Appendix: Estimating Return Moments 
To compute each plan’s performance measures, we must estimate each plan-specific 
mean and variance of returns. We adopt the CAPM asset pricing model and following Calvet, 
Campbell, and Sodini (2007), regress fund returns on three market indexes:                                                            
titititiit EAFEBONDMKTR ,
321   ,  
where is the excess return for fund i; MKT is the excess return for Russell 3000 (broad 
domestic equity market); BOND is the excess return for Lehman US aggregate (broad domestic 
bond market); EAFE is the excess return for MSCI EAFE (international equity market); and the 
time period is 12/97~12/04 (or less if not available for some funds).  Using the estimated risk 
loading from the regression above, we can estimate moments for each fund: 
 , where 
tiR ,
1ˆ
i
,ˆˆ
32 ˆ,ˆ, ii 
f  ˆˆˆ  idiof  ˆ'ˆˆ  fˆ
(ˆ 
 is the vector of estimated mean excess return over all 
funds; is the estimated variance-covariance matrix of excess returns over all funds; ˆ  is the 
vector of three betas over all funds ;
fˆ
)ˆ,ˆ,ˆ(ˆ,)'ˆ,...,ˆ 3211 iiiii bbb  ˆ is the mean excess return 
over three benchmark funds, )'ˆ,ˆ( EAFEBONDˆ ,MKTˆ    ; ˆ
ti,
 is the variance-covariance matrix of 
three benchmark funds; and is the estimated idiosyncratic risk of funds estimated from the 
variance-covariance matrix of regression residuals 
idioˆ
 . 
Based on the estimated mean and variance of returns over all funds, we estimate 
moments of plans: , where  idiopidiofpfp  ˆ'ˆ,ˆ'ˆ,ˆ'ˆ ,   is the weight vector over 
all funds in each plan. 
 
